

**Top Secret**



Fortieth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from  
21 November through 27 November 1973)

*This report has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

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The Key Points

- For the first time this fall, infiltration groups of NVA troops have been detected entering the pipeline en route to the central highlands and southern South Vietnam.
- For the second straight week, intercepted North Vietnamese messages show that large quantities of explosives and ammunition are now stocked in southern North Vietnam. In southern Laos and northern South Vietnam, poor weather continued and Communist logistic movements were light.
- Preliminary analysis  does not provide any further evidence of military deliveries from China or the USSR. This photography leads CIA to believe that there has been no movement of armor out of the major armor training center northwest of Hanoi since photography of late September. DOD, however, continues to believe that most of the tanks observed at this location in late September have now left the area and may be headed south.

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Reviewed by  
NGA

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**Preface**

This is the thirty-eighth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

## DETAILS

**I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies*****Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments***

1. For the first time in the 1973-74 dry season infiltration cycle, intercepted messages have revealed infiltration groups of NVA troops preparing to travel to the B-3 Front and the COSVN area. These groups -- 3006 and 2031 -- were detected with a strength of more than 1,000 troops near Vinh, North Vietnam, on 21 and 28 November, respectively. They were being held up for unspecified reasons until orders to move them farther south were received.

2. These are the first regular infiltration groups detected since an 11 November message from MR 559 to rear services Group 472 stated that the flow of combat troops to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas would be resumed soon (see last week's report). Although Groups 3006 and 2031 are the only new regular combat groups to appear in the pipeline since then, their appearance may mark the start of a renewed flow of troops to the B-3 Front and COSVN, where Communist combat units would need fillers and a pool of replacement personnel to sustain a major offensive. In addition to these groups, one special-purpose group of three persons was detected at Vinh on 21 November. Destined for northern South Vietnam, this group reportedly is traveling with Group 3006.

3. With the detection of Groups 2031 and 3006, we now estimate that some 28,000 North Vietnamese troops have started south thus far in the 1973-74 infiltration cycle, which began on 1 September. This is about 7,000 fewer than during the comparable period in 1972, when 35,000 troops started south. Since 1 September this year, about 80% of the troops have gone to southern Laos and the areas of western South Vietnam through which the new Communist logistic corridor runs. Last year during the comparable period, only about 25% of the new infiltrators went to this area.

4. Signal intelligence of 9 November places the 272nd Regiment, 9th NVA Division in north-central MR 3 on the Binh Long/Phuoc Long Province border. It was formerly located in Binh Long Province. This deployment, coupled with a more tenuous location on 19 November of the E-1 (also known as the 275th) Regiment, 5th NVA Division to the same area, would place two main force regiments within 19 miles of the

**Comparative Starts of Troops  
from North Vietnam, by Destination  
1 September- 28 November**

	1972	1973
<b>Total</b>	<b>35,000</b>	<b>28,000</b>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	10,500	2,000
MR 5	5,000	2,000
B-3 Front	3,000	500
COSVN	8,000	1,000
Southern Laos/MR 559	8,500	22,500

Phuoc Long provincial capital of Phuoc Binh and may presage an increase in Communist military activity in the area of the capital. In addition, these forces also give the Communists the option to reinforce the Bu Prang area of Quang Duc Province. Map 515529 shows the current distribution of Communist and South Vietnamese combat forces, by military region.

5. Farther south, in MR 4, recent SIGINT confirms the move of the forward element of the headquarters of the NVA 1st Infantry Division from the Chau Doc/Takeo Province border eastward to the Kien Tuong/Svay Rieng Province border area. Such a move by a division's forward element usually reflects a change in the status or area of operation of the division. SIGINT, however, continues to locate the divisional headquarters and its three subordinate regiments along the Chau Doc/Cambodian border. Thus, additional information will be required to determine the significance of this move.

***Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies***

6. For the second straight week, large quantities of explosives (probably for road repair and construction) and ammunition were detected in southern North Vietnam. Between 18 and 24 November, Binh Tram 8 near Vinh reported receiving more than 500 tons of cargo, most of which were explosives. Farther south in Quang Binh Province, BT 26 reported on 19 November that it had more than 900 tons of supplies on hand, 200 tons (roughly 4,500 rounds) of which were identified as 122-mm artillery ammunition. BT 26 also reported on 22 November that it would receive 15 railroad cars with some 110 tons of unidentified cargo each day for an unspecified period.

Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam


Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA <sup>1</sup>	RVNAF <sup>2</sup>	VC/NVA	RVNAF
190,000	320,000	92,000	89,000
		325th	VNMC
		324B	Airborne
		320B	1st
		304th	2nd
		711th	3rd
		2nd	Regional Forces

- 1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.
- 2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

MR 1		MR 2		MR 3	
VC/NVA	RVNAF	VC/NVA	RVNAF	VC/NVA	RVNAF
		34,000	68,000	39,000	75,000
		320th	23rd	429th Sapper Command	25th
		10th	22nd	9th	18th
		3rd	Regional Forces	7th	5th
				5th	Regional Forces

MR 4	
VC/NVA	RVNAF
25,000	88,000
1st	21st
	9th
	7th
	44th Special Tactical Zone
	Regional Forces



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7. In southern Laos and northern South Vietnam, most rear service units were engaged in road repair and construction activity (see map 501958). COMINT revealed little cargo moving, as poor weather along the main supply corridors continued to limit traffic and delay the expected start of a major resupply campaign from North Vietnam. All the major NVA logistic units in southern North Vietnam, northern South Vietnam, southern Laos, and northeastern Cambodia were directed, however, to attend a 25 November conference to receive "orders," according to a 21 November intercept. Although no details were given, the "orders" probably relate to the start of the 1973-74 dry season logistic campaign.

## II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

### *South Vietnam*


8. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, since 15 June, and for the last week (21-27 November) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January Cease-Fire</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June Cease-Fire</u>		<u>Last Week (21-27 November)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,020</b>	<b>25,857</b>	<b>1,651</b>	<b>11,902</b>	<b>65(73)<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>633(463)<sup>1</sup></b>
MR 1	1,472	5,316	447	1,957	19	89
MR 2	649	4,303	385	2,449	10	97
MR 3	606	4,568	204	1,992	8	90
MR 4	1,293	11,670	615	5,504	28	357

1. Figures in parenthesis denote totals of the previous week.

9. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the charts following the Annex, however, show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated objectively.





*Laos*

10. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.

**III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina**

*Trends in Hamlet Evaluation System Results Since June*

11. Since the 15 June "second" cease-fire in South Vietnam, Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reporting has shown virtually no change in the relative shares of the population controlled by the government and the Communists. Inaccuracies in reporting from all regions continue to impair the usefulness of the HES results (data for which are wholly gathered and tabulated by the South Vietnamese). The inaccuracies appear to be no greater than they have been in the past, however, and the general trends reflected are probably valid.

12. As of the end of September\* -- the most recent month for which data are available -- 83.4% of South Vietnam's total population of more than 19.5 million people lived in hamlets or urban areas rated "A" (secure) or "B" (relatively secure) -- almost identical with the 30 June figure of 82.8%. Moreover, in the period June-September, there was little month-to-month fluctuation in the countrywide combined A-B figure, although significant changes occurred in some provinces.

13. The stable control situation countrywide was also evident at the regional level between June and September, the greatest change being less than two percentage points (MR 1). As of 30 September, about 58% of MR 1's total population (3.3 million) lived in areas rated A or B -- by far the lowest of any region in South Vietnam. In MR 2, nearly 86% of its 3.5 million population lived in areas rated A or B as of 30 September. MR 3, where more than 95% of the population (5.8 million) lived in areas rated A or B at the end of September, remains the most highly pacified area of South Vietnam. In MR 4, virtually no change occurred in the areas rated A or B, which on 30 September covered about 84% of the region's 7.1 million people.

*Results of Recent Photography over North Vietnam*

14. [redacted] over North Vietnam covered several important military and industrial sites in the northern part of the country. Preliminary analysis of cloud-free imagery over Haiphong Port and parts of the northeast rail system leading from China provides no additional

\* All HES data are reported on an end-of-month basis.

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[redacted]

evidence of military aid deliveries. The level of merchant shipping activity at Haiphong was somewhat below that observed in recent months. Rail and highway traffic on routes leading north and south of Hanoi appeared normal.

25X1 15. [redacted] photography also provided coverage of the Vinh Yen Armor Training Center northwest of Hanoi. Previous coverage of  
25X1 [redacted] over this area caused a divergence of opinion on the armored vehicle inventory at Vinh Yen ([redacted]). The Central Intelligence Agency believes that the film quality [redacted]  
[redacted] was of sufficient quality to indicate that there has been no reduction of armor at Vinh Yen [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] From the latest photography, CIA has identified more than 180 armored vehicles in the area consisting of the following: 121 tanks, 20 probable tanks, 34 armored personnel carriers, and 13 probable armored personnel carriers for a total of 188 vehicles. Although there has been some movement of tanks in the main storage area, most of the tanks were parked there on the latest photography in the same relative positions [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] suggesting that little, if any, inventory turnover has occurred in the past two months.

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25X1 16. [redacted] the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to believe that there has been a significant reduction in the number of tanks at the Vinh Yen Armor Training Center since late September. While both agencies agree 132 tanks were present  
25X1 [redacted] the DOD believes there were only 43 tanks present on  
25X1 [redacted] as opposed to the CIA count of 141 tanks. In the main storage area alone, the DOD believes there has been a substantial reduction of armor. Of the 76 tanks observed [redacted] less than 10 remained [redacted]

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25X1 17. [redacted] photography revealed 25 tanks at the Xuan Mai Military Training Area 20 miles west of Hanoi, about the same number as noted in this area last July. Other military equipment parked in the Xuan Mai area included seven SA-3 launchers, four probable SA-3 launchers, large quantities of SA-2 missiles and support equipment, 15 field artillery pieces, and 60 antiaircraft pieces and fire-directing support equipment.

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[REDACTED]

19. Only two of the several large vehicle storage parks located between the China border and Hanoi were photographed [REDACTED]. The two, located 15 miles northwest of Kep, held an estimated 1,850 trucks, compared with a total of 2,700 trucks seen there in mid-July.

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*New SA-2 Site Near Khe Sanh*

20. Photography [REDACTED] revealed a new SA-2 site six miles southwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip. There are now a total of 10 SA-2 sites in the Khe Sanh area which have been constructed in South Vietnam since the January cease-fire. Only four sites, however, have ever been occupied at any one time.

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ANNEX

INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL  
TO THE SOUTH SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE

The detection of regular infiltration Groups 2031 and 3006 and special-purpose Group M417 at BT 8 in North Vietnam, and the "gap-filling" of Group 2030, increases our estimate of infiltration starts since 1 September by some 1,500 personnel. Since the 15 June second cease-fire, almost 36,000 North Vietnamese have infiltrated south, including nearly 34,000 combat troops and 2,000 specialists. Since the 27 January agreement, about 86,000 personnel have infiltrated southward, including about 78,000 combat troops and 8,000 specialists. Some 61,000 of these personnel have started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese infiltrators starting south, by month and destination, since 1 January 1973.

Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined  
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia  
Since 1 January 1973<sup>1</sup>


	COSVN	B-3 Front	MR 5	MR Tri-Thien-Hue	Southern Laos/ MR 559	Total
Total	14,000	6,000	9,000	14,000	26,500	69,500
Jan	7,000	5,000	4,000	2,500	....	18,500
Feb	5,000	500	....	1,500	1,000	8,000
Mar	....	....	....	1,000	....	1,000
Apr	1,000	....	....	....	....	1,000
May	....	....	....	7,000	....	7,000
Jun	....	....	....	....	1,500	1,500
Jul	....	....	3,000	....	....	3,000
Aug	....	....	....	....	1,500	1,500
Sep	....	....	2,000	2,000	3,000	7,000
Oct	....	....	....	....	14,000	14,000
Nov 1-28	1,000	500	....	....	5,500	7,000

1. Excludes special-purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.



# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)




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# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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